We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large populations of individuals who can play various types of non-cooperative games. The players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is motivated not only by the material payoffs of the strategies, but also by their popularity in the population.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the evolutionary game theory the theoretical approach to model the dynamics of populations is based on the proportional fitness rule. If the random matching and imitation of the individuals with highest payoffs are assumed, the equations which govern the evolution of such populations are the celebrated replicator equations, cf. e.g. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] , and references cited therein.
However, in general the individuals can be oriented not only toward imitating the highest payoff strategies, but they can also take into account other, "noneconomic" factors, in particular popularity of strategies in the population. The idea of combining together the bias towards imitating the strategies of the most payoff-successful agents and the strategies of the majority is not new, cf. for example [7] , where the ideas of imitating the successful, and copying the majority (the conformist transmission), are put together to stabilize the cooperation in populations of individuals, see also [8] for another argument that noneconomic factors influence human's behavior.
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We consider a theory of evolution of social systems, that generalizes the standard proportional fitness rule of the evolutionary game theory. The biological fitness of a behavior, strategy, measured by its payoff from interactions, is replaced by more general function, the attractiveness of the behavior. The attractiveness of the strategy is assumed to depend not only on its payoff, but also on its actual popularity (fraction) in the population. The parameters of the attractiveness function describe different psychological characters of the members of the population. We consider the model based on the generalized Cobb-Douglas utility function, cf. [9] , [10] , [11] . We find a parameter that describes different personality profiles of the players, and that can be identified with the sensitivity to reinforcement in the Matching Law of mathematical psychology [12] . In our setting it determines stability of polymorphic equilibria in all considered classes of games. We note that such equilibria for games with two strategies played in infinite populations were found for example in the aspiration-based models, cf. for example [13, 14] , in general multi-person games, cf. [15] , in the models of social dilemmas with synergy and discounting, cf. [16] , in the Stag-Hunt multiperson games, cf. for example [17] , in the multi-person Snowdrift game, cf. for example [18] and references cited therein.
We prove theorems of the existence of polymorphic equilibria, and identify sufficient conditions for their uniqueness for particular classes of the considered games. We also find examples of the existence of more than one (locally) stable polymorphism.
In the next section we formulate the general model and discuss its basic properties. In section III we briefly remind, for the convenience of the reader, an existence and uniqueness theorem for a general class of two-person symmetric games with two strategies, played in populations with social and material preferences, proved in [11] . We also provide examples of multiple stable internal equilibria for two-person symmetric games with three strategies.
In section IV we discuss polymorphic equilibria for two-person asymmetric games with two strategies, and in section V we consider the multi-person games, in particular the Public Good game. In section VI we conclude and discuss some open problems.
II. MODEL
We consider an infinite homogeneous population of individuals who interact through a random matching, playing at each instant of time a two-person or a multi-person non-cooperative game. The players have a finite number K of behavioral types (strategies). Let N i (t) denotes the number of individuals playing the strategy i, N = N 1 + N 2 + ...N Kthe fixed size of the system, p i = N i /N -the frequency, or popularity of behavior i for i = 1, 2, ..., K.
The players who play a strategy i review their strategy according to the Poisson process with the arrival rate r i . We model the corresponding stochastic processes as a deterministic flow. The balance conservation equations read, cf. e.g. [5] , section 4.4:
where p i j is the probability that the agent playing the j strategy will switch to the i strategy. We assume that p i j is proportional to the attractiveness u i of the strategy i:
In general the attractiveness of a strategy can be a complicated function of various factors, describing the state of the system and the characteristics of the players. Many social and biological interactions are based on imitation processes, where individuals adopt more successful and more popular strategies with larger probability than less successful and less popular ones. We choose for the attractiveness of the strategy i the generalized Cobb-Douglas utility function, cf. [9] [10] [11] :
The formula (3) states that the attractiveness of a strategy depends not only on the payoff of the strategy, but also on its actual popularity in the population. The parameters α, β determine the responsiveness of the function u i to changes of the current popularity and of the mean payoff of the action i. They define different social and material preferences of the individuals, in other words their different personality profiles.
More attractive strategies ought to have an evolutionary advantage in the considered social systems. Note that the attractiveness of the strategy i is increasing and concave function of both arguments, i.e. of the mean payoff ν i and of the popularity p i in the population.
In particular when the attractiveness reaches a higher level, the changes are slower. The attractiveness of the strategy becomes zero if its mean payoff or its popularity in the population is zero. In the Appendix, p. A we define and characterize the ideal types of the personality profiles for α, β ∈ {0, 1}, and characterize their basic properties, cf. [10, 11] .
All other values of the parameters α, β describe intermediate personality profiles. We show below that the combination of these parameters
plays a crucial role in determining the polymorphic equlibria and their stability, and can be identified with the sensitivity parameter which links the relative rates of reinforcements and responses in the Hernstein's Matching Law [12] .
As postulated in (2), the strategies with higher attractivenesses have larger probability to be imitated. Assuming that the arrival rates r j are constants, and rescaling the time we obtain the system of equations which has the formal structure analogous to the replicator equations:ṗ
Thus, the fraction p i of strategy i increases if its normalized attractiveness
bigger than the actual fraction of the strategy i, and decreases if it is smaller. In particular, for α = β = 0, corresponding to Homo Afectualis (cf. the Appendix, p. A) the evolution equations (5) are identical to the replicator equations of the evolutionary game theory.
All critical points of the dynamics (5) are obtained as solutions of the system of K − 1 algebraic equations
which, after substituting (3) is equivalent to
where ν i is the mean payoff of strategy i. In particular the stability properties of the solutions of eqs. (6) depend on the combination s of the parameters α, β, which characterize the personality profile of the players, rather than separately on each of them. The sensitivity parameter s plays an important role in the matching law in the operant response theory of the mathematical psychology, in particular as a measure of the degree to which, in equilibrium, the response ratio changes when the reinforcement ratio is modified, cf. for example [10] [11] [12] , and references cited therein.
III. EQUILIBRIA FOR TWO-PERSON SYMMETRIC GAMES
In this section we consider populations which play symmetric 2-person games. For a convenience of the reader we first remind the results for the case of two strategies, proved in [11] .
A. 2-Person Games with 2 Strategies
For the symmetric 2-person games with two strategies (denoted 1,2), with the payoff matrix
where a, b, c, d are arbitrary positive numbers, we obtain the full characterization of the equilibria. With the normalization condition p 1 + p 2 = 1 eq. (5) reduces to the evolution
there exist two pure equilibria of (5):
The equilibria of eq. (5) in which each strategy has a non zero frequency will be called Mixed Equilibria, and denoted ME. Each ME corresponds to a fixed point of eq. (8) . For the symmetric 2-person games the following theorem is true:
For the payoff matrix (7) with positive entries:
I. For each 0 ≤ s < ∞ there exists at least one ME -the fixed point of the evolution equation (8) .
bc ≥ ad, then ME is unique.
III. For each 0 ≤ s < ∞ there exist at most three ME.
IV. There exist three ME iff ∆ > 0, B < 0, and
and U (z) := lnz + s ln cz+d az+b , z > 0.
V. If a ME is unique, then it is globally stable in (0, 1) under the considered dynamics. If there are three ME, then the middle one is (locally) instable, the other two stable.
The statement I implies that the dependence of the attractiveness of a strategy on its popularity implies the existence of at least one ME for all symmetric two-person games with positive payoffs, including all types of the social dilemma games. In particular this "solves the dilemma" of the Prisoner's Dilemma population game. The statement II.2 implies that for s ≤ 1 the cooperation level is unique, and does not depend on the initial distribution of strategies. For the proof, interpretations and applications to various types of 2-person games the reader is referred to [11] .
B. 2-Person Symmetric Games with 3 Strategies

General results
2-person symmetric games with 3 strategies play important role in the population game theory. First we formulate the general setting in the frame of populations with complex personality profiles, then we discuss particular types of such games.
The general symmetric 2-person game with 3 strategies, denoted 1, 2, 3, has the payoff matrix 
where we assume a ij > 0 ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. The mean payoffs of strategies 1, 2, 3 are defined
with p 3 = 1 − p 1 − p 2 . The dynamical system (5) has the forṁ
For the 3-strategy games we define mixed equilibria (ME) of (11) as the critical points of the above dynamical system with all nonzero coordinates p i , i = 1, 2, 3. We shall alternatively use the term polymorphic equilibria. With notation
the equations for ME can be written, using (3), (6), (10), in the form
The frequencies of the strategies in ME are obtained from the reverse formulas:
In general the number of ME and their stability depend on the payoff matrix and on the sensitivity parameter s.
One of the most celebrated 3-strategy games is the Rock-Paper-Scissor (RPS) game, cf. for example [5, 6] . The population of players with complex personality profiles, playing the RSP game has been investigated in [19] . In particular, in the "standard" RPS game the critical point ( ) is asymptotically stable for all α, β ∈ (0, 1]. For other properties of the solutions, in particular the existence of limit cycles, the Hopf and the Boutin-like bifurcations, the reader is referred to [19] .
Below we analyze other important classes of 3-strategy symmetric games, in particular the coordination games, for which there exist multiple stable polymorphic equilibria, and the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game with three strategies AllD, AllC, TFT, with unique stable ME.
Coordination Game
We consider the coordination game with 3 strategies and the payoff matrix 
We demonstrate the existence of three ME for s = 3. For s = 1 the system (14), (15) 
For s = 2 the system (14), (15) is of the third order. In order to obtain analytical solution we subtract (15) from (14), and obtain the equation
It can be easily shown that (18) has positive solution only if y = x, in which case the solution of the system (14), (15) is the pair (x 0 , x 0 ), where x 0 ∼ = 2.45 is the unique positive root of the polynomial
The corresponding unique equilibrium state reads (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) ∼ = (0.17, 0.415, 0.415). When we farther increase the value of the sensitivity parameter s the uniqueness is lost. In Figure 1 we show time evolution of frequencies ( parameter s, and on the personality profile parameters α, β. For s = 3.75 both locally stable ME tend to the relevant vortexes of the game simplex, cf. the right diagram in Figure 1 .
We explain the emergence of the multiple equilibria for s = 3. First we look for the symmetric solution p 2 = p 3 , i.e. x = y. The system (14) , (15) reduces to one equation
The unique positive root of the polynomial in (20) There are two other, symmetric ME.
The first zero gives the ME: (p 1 , p 2 , p 3 ) ∼ = (0.047, 0.057, 0.896). As expected from the symmetry of the second and third strategy, the second zero gives the "symmetric" ME: prove the existence and uniqueness theorem for another class of the asymmetric coordination games, in which both players are better off if they play different strategies (anti-coordination games).
Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game
Another interesting example of three-strategy games is the 2-person, 3-strategy finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game with the payoff matrix
where T > R > P ≥ S are the payoffs in the one-shot PD game, AllC (AllD) is the strategy:
play always C (play always D), TFT is the strategy Tit for Tat, and m is the number of rounds.
In the classical replicator dynamics, with the payoff from TFT additionally reduced by a small value (the cost of playing TFT) it has been shown in [21] , that the population evolves through the cycles of cooperation and defection.
For the general matrix (21) we checked numerically the existence and uniqueness of ME for for wide ranges of the payoffs T > R > P ≥ S and of the parameters m, s. Moreover, the share (sum of the frequencies) of the cooperative strategies AllC and TFT decreases for increasing ratio T R and increasing number of rounds, whereas for increasing m it increases, in agreement with intuition.
For the Weak Prisoner's Dilemma (P = S = 0) we prove
There exists an unique ME:
), where a = [
] s , of the game (21) with P = S = 0, for all nonnegative sensitivity parameters s.
Proof. Eq. (15) for the ME gives y = 1. Eq. (14) gives a = [
] s , and the result follows from (16) .
Note that for the increasing ratio
T R the shares of the AllC and TFT players in ME decrease, whereas for increasing m they increase, as in the case of the general payoff matrix (21).
IV. 2-PERSON ASYMMETRIC GAMES A. General Results
In this section we consider 2-person games played between members of two populations with (in general) different personality profiles. The members of both populations choose between two strategies A and B. The payoff matrix reads
with nonnegative entries. In general the strategies in both populations may be different meanings. For simplicity we do not use different notation for the relevant pairs of strategies.
The row players belong to the population i = 1, and the column ones to i = 2. We denote x i , i = 1, 2, the fraction of population i which plays strategy A.
Let (α i , β i ) describe the personality profile of the individuals of population i, i = 1.2. The members of each population may put different weights to the payoffs and popularities of the available strategies in the imitation process.
We define u i j -the attractiveness of strategy j ∈ {A, B} in population i ∈ {1, 2}:
where ν ji is the mean payoff from strategy j in population i:
Thus, the attractiveness of each strategy of a population depends on two factors: the "social" one, represented by the fraction, popularity of the strategy in the population, and the "economic" one, represented by the mean payoff of this strategy in the considered population. Note that the social factor depends on the composition of the considered population, whereas the economic one depends on the composition of the second population. This can be interpreted in the following way: the members of each population determine their strategy choice observing popularity of the available strategies in their own population, and their payoffs from the interactions with the members of the other population.
The dynamics (5), written for asymmetric games, readṡ
Note that for α i = β i = 0, i = 1, 2 the system (25) reduces to the replicator dynamics for asymmetric games, cf. for example [5, 6] . The pairs of (x 1 , x 2 ): (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) are equilibria in pure strategies of (25). They correspond to the situations in which each population plays only one of two available strategies. We are looking for the mixed equilibria (ME) in which both strategies have nonzero frequencies for each population.
With the substitution z i = x i 1−x i , i = 1, 2 the system readṡ
From (26) we obtain the algebraic equations for ME:
where
denotes sensitivity of players in population i. Thus, for the asymmetric 2-person games the ME are determined by relevant combinations of parameters s 1 , s 2 which describe the personalities of players respectively in the first and the in the second population. In the next subsections we show the existence of ME for typical asymmetric games. Here we prove that, contrary to the replicator equations for asymmetric 2-person games, the solutions can not be periodic.
Theorem 3. The system (26) does not have periodic solutions.
Proof. We define the function φ(
, and note that
Applying the criterion Dulac-Bendixson we obtain the thesis.
B. Asymmetric coordination games
Pure coordination games
We consider the model defined in the previous section for the asymmetric coordination games 
Coordination games with multiple ME
In asymmetric coordination games the positivity of payoffs plays crucial role in the uniqueness problem, and in determining the polymorphic equilibria. In the pure coordination games considered above the ME is unique, whereas in general coordination games multiple stable polymorphic equilibria are possible. For example, the 2-person asymmetric game with the payoff matrix   (3, 2) (1, 1)
has, for s 1 = s 2 = 3, three ME, corresponding to (x 1 ≈ 0.92, x 2 ≈ 0.82), (x 1 = 0.6, x 2 = 0.40), and (x 1 ≈ 0.18, x 2 ≈ 0.08), as can be checked solving (27). Two equilibria are locally stable, one unstable, cf. Fig. 2 .
FIG. 2:
Examples of trajectories and critical points for the asymmetric coordination game (31):
All six displayed trajectories start from a neighborhood of the points (0, 1) or (1, 0).
V. MULTI-PERSON GAMES
A. General results
In this section we consider multi-person one-shot symmetric games in which each of N players chooses one of two actions: C or D, C stands for cooperation, D for defection. In order to obtain symmetric notation and formulas, we define n := N − 1, and from now on we consider the n + 1-person games. This allows to define: where k ∈ {0, . . . , n}, and a k , b k ≥ 0.
Let x denote the fraction of the population that plays C. The mean payoffs from both strategies are respectively
The evolution equation readṡ
is a positive function which does not influence the equilibria and their stabilities but only the speed of the evolution.
Stationary points of the dynamics described by (33) can be obtained solving the equation
is the previously defined sensitivity coefficient. We prove the following
The dynamics (32) of the symmetric (n+1)-person game has at most 2n+1 mixed equilibria.
Proof. We define the function U (z) : R + → R + :
Zeros of U are stationary points of the considered dynamics, and sgn(U (z)| z 0 ) = sgn(ż| z 0 ).
It is sufficient to show that U (z) = 0 at at most 2n + 1 points in (0, +∞). To this end we calculate
has at most 2n zeros. Since between each two zeros of U there has to be a zero of U (z), the function U (z) can have at most 2n + 1 zeros.
Theorem 6.
For the (n+1)-person games with two strategies and with all payoffs positive there exists at least one mixed equilibrium.
Proof. Due to continuity of the considered dynamics is enough to prove that both boundary equilibrium points corresponding to pore equilibria: x = 0, x = 1 are unstable. This will be proved in two lemmas below. Proof. It is enough to apply Lemma 1 with the strategies interchanged.
The above theorem guarantees the existence, however not uniqueness of the ME (we remind that for the 2-person symmetric games with positive payoffs the uniqueness has been proved for s ≤ 1. Below we give an example of a 3-person game with positive payoffs and three ME for the sensitivity s = 1.
. The corresponding payoff matrix reads: 
Note that this game can be treated as a coordination game (the players are better off if they play the same strategies). The equation for ME reads:
which, for s = 1 has three positive roots, resulting, after substitution z = x 1−x in three ME:
. We checked that x 1 and x 3 are locally stable, and x 2 unstable.
B. Public Goods game
We apply the general results of the previous subsection to the important (n + 1)-person game-the Public Goods (PG) game. In this game each of (n + 1) players receives an amount g, and chooses one of two actions: C: Contribute with g into the common pool or D: Do not contribute. Let k among n + 1 players choose C. The amount kg in the common pool is multiplied by r, n + 1 > r > 1, and distributed equally among n + 1 players. Using the notation for the payoffs in the (n+1)-person game introduced in (V A) and the normalization g = 1 we obtain the following payoffs of the strategies respectively C and D in the PG game:
Below we investigate equilibria for the PG game. We show that their number and stability properties are the same as of a 2-person Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, of which it is the multiple, see definition below. Thus, since any 2-person PD with positive payoffs has at least one and at most three internal equilibria, the same is true for the PG game. We begin with the definition of the multiple of any 2-person symmetric game. 
.., n. Thus, in the multiple of the 2-person symmetric game the payoff of a player is the sum of his payoffs from all the 2-person games with the other n players. We prove Lemma 3. Any 2-person symmetric game and its multiple have the same equilibria in the dynamics (32). Moreover, the stability properties of the equilibria of both games are the same.
Proof. For the multiple of the 2-person game we have
and analogously W B (z) = n(1 + z) n−1 (zc + d). As previously we define the function U , zeros of which are stationary points of the considered dynamics:
Thus, the function U (z) for the (n + 1)-person game which is the multiple of the 2-person game is the same as for the 2-person game. In consequence both games have the same equilibria, and the stability properties of the corresponding equilibria are identical.
Now we come back to the PG (n+1)-person game with the payoffs a k = (k +1)p, b k = kp+1, with 1 n+1 < p < 1. We note that they can be rewritten as
It means that Public Goods game is the multiple of the PD game with the payoff matrix
therefore, from Lemma 3 it is sufficient to investigate the dynamics for the PD game (39).
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we discussed the evolutionary dynamics of populations of agents with complex personality profiles, which is governed by the attractiveness of strategies rather than by their ) of the game (41) with a i = a > 0, i = 1, 2, 3 for all s > 0.
Proof. We check that x = y = 1, which corresponds to the above ME, satisfy (14), (15) .
For x = y, subtracting (15) from (14) we obtain the equation
which can not be satisfied due to different signs of both sides.
For the general anti-coordination game with arbitrary a ij , s such that a ij > a kk > 0 for all k and all i = j, i, j, k = 1, 2, 3, we checked numerically the existence of an unique ME for all considered numerical values of these parameters. 
and b i > 0, c i > 0, i = 1, 2. We prove the following theorem The equilibrium (45) is locally asymptotically stable if s 1 s 2 < 1, and unstable if s 1 s 2 > 1.
The proof is analogous as in Theorem 4 and is omitted. Numerical simulations indicate that if the equilibrium (30) is locally stable then it attracts all investigated trajectories from the interior of the simplex of the game.
